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The origin of eusociality in the Hymenoptera is a question of major interest. Theory has tended
to focus on genetic relatedness, but ecology can be just as important a determinant of whether
eusociality evolves. Using the model of Fu et al. (2015), we show how ecological assumptions crit-
ically affect the conclusions drawn. Fu et al. inferred that eusociality rarely evolves because it
faces a fundamental ‘risk-return tradeoff’. The intuitive logic was that worker production repre-
sents an opportunity cost because it delays realising a reproductive payoff. However, making
empirically justified assumptions that (1) workers take over egg-laying following queen death and
(2) productivity increases gradually with each additional worker, we find that the risk-return
tradeoff disappears. We then survey Hymenoptera with more specialised morphological castes,
and show how the interaction between two common features of eusociality – saturating birth rates
and group size-dependent helping decisions – can determine whether eusociality outperforms other
strategies.
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The origin and maintenance of eusociality is a question of
major interest in evolutionary biology. In eusocial and coop-
eratively-breeding taxa, some individuals, known as helpers or
workers, at least temporarily forfeit their own reproduction to
aid the reproduction of other individuals known as queens or
breeders. The main approach used to understand the seem-
ingly paradoxical behaviour of helpers has been inclusive fit-
ness theory as embodied by Hamilton’s Rule (Hamilton
1964). Hamilton’s Rule states that an individual should help
to rear the queen’s offspring if rb > c, where r is queen-
worker genetic relatedness, b is the reproductive benefit to the
queen of the help she receives and c is the cost of helping to
the worker (offspring forfeited).
The eusocial Hymenoptera (ants, bees and wasps) range
from ‘primitively eusocial’, where there are no fixed differ-
ences between queens and workers and individuals can
switch roles, to ‘advanced eusocial’ where there may be
extreme queen-worker dimorphism and irreversibly sterile
workers. Starting with Hamilton’s (1964) famous three-
quarters relatedness hypothesis, theoretical attempts to
understand why eusociality evolved in Hymenoptera have
tended to focus on factors that can raise genetic relatedness
such as haplodiploidy and more recently, lifetime queen
monogamy (e.g. Trivers & Hare 1976; Seger 1983; Boomsma
2009; Fromhage & Kokko 2011; Nonacs 2011, 2014; Gard-
ner et al. 2012; Quinones & Pen 2017; Rautiala et al. 2019).
It remains equivocal, however, whether relatedness really was
unusually high in the ancestors of today’s eusocial taxa
(Nonacs 2011; Pernu & Helantera 2019), and the ecological
parameters in Hamilton’s Rule are potentially just as
important determinants of whether helping or solitary nesting
is the optimal strategy (Queller 1994, 1996; Field et al. 2000;
Korb & Heinze 2008; Avila & Fromhage 2015). Recent mod-
els suggest that two features of life history and ecology have
a critical impact on whether eusociality evolves: the potential
for workers to take over egg-laying following the queen’s
death, and the relationship between group size and produc-
tivity (Fromhage & Kokko 2011; Nonacs 2011, 2019; Fu
et al. 2015). Focussing on a recent paper by Fu et al. (2015),
we first show how making unrealistic assumptions about
these two features can produce apparently far-reaching but
incorrect conclusions. We then incorporate more realistic
assumptions.
Fu et al. (2015) used a structured population model to com-
pare solitary (non-social) and eusocial genotypes in terms of
basic reproductive numbers and long-term probabilities of lin-
eage extinction. They used Markov chain and Branching pro-
cesses to model group and population dynamics respectively in
continuous time with overlapping generations (cf discrete time
models such as Wild 2011; Lehmann et al. 2016; Mullon et al.
2016). Fu et al. came to the potentially important conclusion
that eusociality faces an inherent ‘risk-return tradeoff’. By defi-
nition, eusociality entails the production of non-reproductive
worker offspring. The rationale underlying the risk-return
tradeoff is that worker production represents an opportunity
cost for a eusocial queen because it delays her fitness payoff
(Fu et al. 2015): her group may fail before reproductive off-
spring are produced. This cost is avoided by solitary individu-
als that produce entirely reproductives. The opportunity cost
means that for eusociality to outperform the solitary strategy
in Fu et al.’s model, the rewards (reproductive offspring) even-
tually associated with a successful eusocial group must be so
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large as to be unlikely. For example, in a numerical example
they focus on (their fig. 2), eusociality has a higher extinction
probability than the solitary strategy in about half of the
parameter space, even when groups of three individuals are 20
times as productive as solitary individuals. Fu et al. link their
findings to the apparent rarity with which eusociality has
evolved in nature, and the fact that it has been lost repeatedly
in some lineages of bees (Wcislo & Danforth 1997; Rehan
et al. 2014). The existence of a fundamental risk-return trade-
off characterising eusociality is thus an important finding
worth evaluating.
We hypothesised that the ‘riskiness’ of the eusocial strategy
in Fu et al.’s model might reflect two ecological assumptions
that seem unrealistic in the early stages of eusocial evolution:
(1) queen replacement is not allowed, so that a queen’s death
results in failure of the whole group; (2) there is a threshold
group size below which workers add nothing to group pro-
ductivity, and although productivity does increase at the
threshold, it increases no further if group size exceeds the
threshold. To more closely match hymenopteran biology, we
modify these assumptions as well as a third assumption that
(3) individual workers are immortal. We find that the risk-re-
turn tradeoff then disappears. Drawing on empirical data, we
next extend the model and show how two common features
of more specialised eusocial groups – saturating birth rates
and group size-dependent helping decisions – interact to deter-
mine whether eusociality outperforms other strategies. We
conclude that Fu et al.’s modelling framework is potentially
useful, but the precise assumptions made about ecology are
critical.
RESULTS
Fu et al.’s basic model assumes asexuality and relatedness of
1.0, allowing them to focus on ecological effects. Group
dynamics are specified as follows. Females of the solitary
genotype have death rate d0 and produce offspring at rate b0.
All of their offspring are reproductives (new queens) that dis-
perse and initiate new nests alone (Fig. 1a). Reproductive
females of the eusocial genotype also initiate nests alone, but
in contrast with solitary females, they produce offspring that
with probability q (the ‘staying ratio’) become life-long work-
ers on their natal nests (Fig. 1b). The remaining proportion
1  q of offspring are dispersing reproductives. Once a maxi-
mum group size (M) is reached, new offspring must all dis-
perse. By staying on their natal nests, workers can boost the
reproductive success of their mother queen, both by helping
to rear more offspring and by reducing the queen’s death rate.
Fu et al. model this as a threshold effect: at group size m, the
offspring birth rate increases from b0 to b and the queen’s
death rate decreases from d0 to d. Death of the queen termi-
nates the entire group, but worker mortality does not other-
wise occur. Across most of the parameter space investigated,
Fu et al. found that eusocial genotypes performed worse than
solitary genotypes in terms of the chance of lineage extinction,
which occurs when the initial eusocial group and all descen-
dant groups have terminated. In addition, eusocial genotypes
often had smaller basic reproductive numbers (R), where R is
the number of dispersing reproductive offspring that one soli-
tary individual or eusocial group produces in its lifetime





























Figure 1 Schematic showing Markov chain dynamics assumed for (a) Solitary strategy; (b) Fu et al.’s eusocial strategy with a threshold group size m = 3;
(c) our Primitively Eusocial strategy with inheritance of the queen position, birth rates that increase linearly with group size, and worker mortality.
Numbers in blue circles represent group size (including the queen) from i = 1 to a maximum size M (here M = 4). Green arrows represent births of
offspring that stay and help (at rate q 9 birth rate) or disperse (at rate (1  q) 9 birth rate). Red arrows represent deaths of individuals (rate d or d0) or
(downward arrows) catastrophic group failure (rate d0 or, above the threshold group size in part (b), rate d).
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We proceeded initially by modifying assumptions (1)–(3)
one by one. We illustrate our findings in detail with the
parameter values that Fu et al. focussed on, except that we
use M = 3 because a small group size seems appropriate when
modelling the origin of eusociality (Fu et al. focussed on
M = 2 and especially M = 100). However, we obtained quali-
tatively similar results with larger group sizes (e.g. M = 10;
full details of our mathematical methods are in the Support-
ing Information). To be consistent with Fu et al., we compare
models in terms of both R and the extinction probability.
However, we believe that R is a less reliable performance
measure when modelling overlapping generations in continu-
ous time. Particularly when queen replacement is allowed,
eusocial groups tend to have far greater lifespans then solitary
individuals, so that R is measured over a longer time period
for eusociality, and tends to be positively correlated with
group size (e.g. see Fig. 5).
Assumption (1): queen replacement
Fu et al. assumed that the death of a eusocial queen results in
catastrophic group failure. This assumption seems likely to
contribute to the risk inherent in eusociality: when the queen
dies, the lifespans of any of her offspring that chose to help
are truncated, whereas offspring of solitary individuals always
continue to reproduce until they die. Furthermore, queen
death will tend to prevent groups from reaching the threshold
group size m at which worker benefits kick in. The empirical
examples that Fu et al. refer to are primitively eusocial Hyme-
noptera, which exhibit minimal morphological differentiation
between queens and workers. This is appropriate when con-
sidering the origin and spread of a eusocial strategy, since
marked morphological differentiation is unlikely to be present
initially. In such taxa, workers are not irreversibly committed
to their roles. Queen death does not normally lead to group
failure because a worker can take over the queen position.
Queen replacement is indeed the norm in the major lineages
of primitively eusocial Hymenoptera where it has been studied
(Nonacs 2014), including sweat bees (e.g. Yanega 1989; Mich-
ener 1990; Mueller 1991; Field et al. 2010), carpenter bees
(e.g. Stark 1992), hover wasps (Bridge & Field 2007; Field
2008) and paper wasps (e.g. Strassmann et al. 2004; Tsuji &
Tsuji 2005). We modified Fu et al.’s model to allow for queen
replacement. If the current queen died in a group of size i, a
worker was assumed to take over as queen, allowing the
group to continue reproducing with the birth rate and queen
death rate appropriate to a group of size i  1. Group failure
then occurs only if successive queens die faster than new
workers are recruited. In contrast with Fu et al.’s findings,
eusociality then has a higher basic reproductive number and
lower risk of extinction than the solitary strategy (Fig. 2,
Fu + Inheritance vs. Solitary).
Assumption (2): the relationship between productivity and group
size
The second of Fu et al.’s assumptions that we modify has two
parts. The first part is that a eusocial queen’s reproductive
rate remains the same as a solitary female’s reproductive rate
(b0) until a threshold group size m is reached. Only at group
size m does the birth rate increase to b. The second part is
that if group size exceeds m as more workers are recruited,
the birth rate does not increase beyond b. Using a threshold
m again seems likely to contribute to the risk associated with
eusociality: workers add nothing to the queen’s productivity if
the group fails before the threshold group size is reached, and
additional workers above the threshold contribute nothing
unless group size falls back down to m. In contrast, the off-
spring of solitary females are assumed to reproduce continu-
ously from birth. In reality, in all of the major lineages of
primitively eusocial wasps and bees, the queen’s reproductive
rate normally increases gradually, often linearly, with each
additional worker (e.g. Yanega 1989; Shreeves & Field 2002;
Brand & Chapuisat 2014). And the queen’s reproductive rate
increases in the presence of just one or two workers, rather
than only above a threshold group size (Fig. 3). This reflects
worker foraging to provision the queen’s offspring at all
group sizes, and the fact that the nest is guarded almost con-
tinuously once at least one worker is present. These are both
advantages likely to have operated even at the evolutionary
(a) (b)
Figure 2 Relationship between the probability that offspring become workers (staying ratio q) and (a) basic reproductive numbers (R) and (b) the
probability of avoiding extinction (‘emergence probability’ of Fu et al. 2015) for the models discussed in the main text: Fu et al.’s Solitary and Eusocial
strategies; Fu et al.’s Eusocial strategy with each of the three assumptions discussed in the text relaxed separately (dashed lines); and our Primitively
Eusocial strategy with all three assumptions relaxed simultaneously. Parameter values are similar to Fu et al.’s figure 2, with M = m = 3, d0 = 0.1,
d = 0.05, b0 = 0.12, b = 0.45, bΔ = (b  b0)/(m  1) = 0.165.
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origin of eusociality (e.g. Queller 1994). If we allow productiv-
ity to increase by the same amount (bΔ) for each additional
worker irrespective of group size, both the basic reproductive
number and the probability of avoiding extinction become
higher for eusociality than for solitary nesting, even without
allowing inheritance (Fig. 2, Fu + Linear Birth Rate vs. Soli-
tary). By immediately boosting the reproductive success of the
queen at all group sizes, each worker is now reproducing as
efficiently as the dispersing offspring of a solitary female, or
more efficiently if per capita productivity increases with
increasing group size (as in our Fig. 2 where bΔ > b0).
Another possibility, which would at least partially remove the
disadvantage that a threshold group size causes for eusocial-
ity, would be if offspring stay and help in the first place only
when their groups are small (Appendix IIA in Fu et al. 2015,
Liao et al. 2015). There is some evidence for this, especially in
large-colony taxa (see below), but the only experimental test
in a primitively eusocial hymenopteran provided no evidence
that staying decisions were group size-dependent (Field et al.
1999).
Assumption (3): worker mortality
The third assumption we modified is that workers are immor-
tal except when catastrophic whole-nest failure occurs. We
added worker mortality to Fu et al.’s model, so that
individual workers had the same death rate (d0) as solitary
females (e.g. Field et al. 2000). As expected given that only
eusocial nests have workers, allowing worker mortality (while
not allowing inheritance and retaining a threshold group size
before productivity increases) is disadvantageous for eusocial-
ity compared with solitary nesting (Fig. 2: Fu + W mortality).
Combining all three modifications of the model
Allowing queen replacement in Fu et al.’s model, or switching
from a threshold to a linear increase in the birth rate with
increasing group size, results in eusociality outperforming soli-
tary nesting when the maximum group size is 3 (Fig. 2) or 10
(Supporting Information). Adding just worker mortality has
the opposite effect. We lastly combined all three of these mod-
ifications to produce an overall, ecologically more realistic
Primitively Eusocial model (Fig. 1c). With this model and our
illustrative parameter values, the risk-return tradeoff that Fu
et al. highlighted disappears: at all staying ratios, eusociality
has higher basic reproductive numbers and lower extinction
probabilities than solitary nesting (Fig. 2, Primitively Eusocial
vs. Solitary). The larger the staying ratio (q), the larger the
advantage that eusociality has (assuming bΔ > b0; Fig. 2). This
contrasts with Fu et al.’s finding that eusociality always per-
forms worse than solitary nesting, or (depending on parameter
values) performs better only at intermediate staying ratios
(e.g. Fig. 2, Fu et al Eusocial vs. Solitary) or when workers
have a huge positive impact on the offspring birth rate.
Beyond the precise parameter values used in Fig. 2, Fig. 4
generalises our findings to the larger areas of parameter space
investigated by Fu et al. (see also Fig. S5 in Supporting Infor-
mation).
The origin of more specialised eusocial taxa
Even if they are not applicable to the origin of eusociality,
could the ecological assumptions underlying the risk-return
tradeoff apply to the origin of more specialised castes in taxa
such as honeybees and ants? Such taxa usually have signifi-
cant queen-worker dimorphism so that workers cannot
become fully functional queens (H€olldobler & Wilson 1990;
Bourke & Franks 1995; Peeters & Molet 2010). Below, we
survey the empirical literature in relation to Fu et al.’s
assumptions, and show how two common features of the rela-
tionship between group size and productivity in more spe-
cialised taxa can interact to determine extinction probabilities.
Queen replacement and consequences of queen death in more
specialised taxa
Even though a worker cannot become a fully functional
replacement queen in taxa with morphologically specialised
castes, queen death typically does not completely truncate the
productive lives of remaining workers as assumed in Fu
et al.’s models. In some such taxa, complete queen loss is any-
way unlikely because there are multiple queens per group, and
because additional daughter queens can be adopted if neces-
sary (Bourke & Franks 1995; Keller 1995; Peeters & Molet
2010). Even in species with only a single queen, however,
there are mechanisms that allow workers remaining after
Figure 3 Observed relationships between group size and measures of
group productivity in five species of primitively eusocial Hymenoptera,
scaled so that they fit into the same plot, compared with the threshold
relationship assumed by Fu et al. with m = 3 and b0 = 0.12, b = 0.45.
Species (productivity measure and scaling) as follows: sweat bee Halictus
scabiosae (number of second brood offspring/5; Brand & Chapuisat
2014); hover wasp Liostenogaster flavolineata (daily offspring hatch
rate 9 9; Shreeves & Field 2002); paper wasp Polistes dominula (number
of brood in cofoundress nests/50; Shreeves et al. 2003); sweat bee Halictus
rubicundus (number of second brood offspring/15; Yanega 1989);
carpenter bee Xylocopa sulcatipes (number of offspring/10 in 1986; Stark
1992)
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queen death to be productive. First, workers can often rear a
replacement queen (e.g. honeybees, stingless bees and some
ants; Bourke & Franks 1995; Hatch et al. 1999; Miller & Rat-
nieks 2001; Faustino et al. 2002; Clemencet et al. 2008; Alves
et al. 2009), or daughter queens already present can be
adopted as replacements (e.g. Tschinkel & Howard 1978;
Tschinkel 1996; Peeters & Molet 2010). Second, although spe-
cialised hymenopteran workers are often unable to mate and
lay female eggs, they can usually still lay unfertilised male
eggs. Thus, even if queen death is followed by gradual die-off
of existing workers and eventual group extinction, remaining
workers can produce their own male reproductives (e.g. bum-
blebees, honeybees, vespine wasps, many ants: Miller & Rat-
nieks 2001; Dijkstra & Boomsma 2007; Smith et al. 2007;
Peeters & Molet 2010; Almond et al. 2019) as well as rear
remaining offspring of the queen through to adulthood (many
ants: Dijkstra & Boomsma 2006, 2007).
The closest approximation to Fu et al.’s assumption about
queen death may be the minority of taxa (c. 9 ant genera and
Frieseomelitta stingless bees) where there is a single queen and
completely sterile workers that cannot lay eggs of either sex.
Some of the above mechanisms may still operate, however
(e.g. adoption of a daughter queen; Tschinkel & Howard
1978; Tschinkel 1996), along with additional taxon-specific
mechanisms such as fusion with a related colony after queen
death (Kronauer et al. 2010; see also Peeters & Molet 2010).
The mechanisms above mean that queen death will not usu-
ally lead to catastrophic group failure in Hymenoptera with
morphologically specialized workers. Furthermore, even if
there was partial truncation of worker productivity, for exam-
ple if offspring production is delayed while a new queen is
reared (e.g. Tschinkel & Howard 1978; Miller & Ratnieks
2001; Faustino et al. 2002), its effect on the probability of
extinction would depend on queen mortality rates (Section 8
and Fig. S11 of Supporting Information). In advanced euso-
cial taxa with only a single queen, queens tend to be extremely
long-lived, reflecting the protected environment within their
nests (e.g. 20 year queen lifespan: Pamilo 1991; see also Keller
& Genoud 1997; Peeters & Molet 2010). In ecological situa-
tions where individual queens have higher mortality rates, so
that any truncation of worker productivity might otherwise be
more frequent, there tend to be multiple queens per group
(Keller & Genoud 1997).
The relationship between group size and productivity in more
specialised taxa
In advanced eusocial taxa, there is also little evidence for Fu
et al.’s second assumption, that groups must reach a certain
size before workers can boost the queen’s productivity. How-
ever, the relationship between group size and productivity
often differs from that assumed for our Primitively Eusocial
strategy (Fig. 4). Although productivity (including both
worker and reproductive offspring) increases linearly with
group size in some advanced eusocial species (as assumed in
Fig. 4), it is probably commoner for the relationship to satu-
rate in larger groups (Michener 1964; Tschinkel 1993; Wagner
& Gordon 1999; Kramer et al. 2014). Saturating (declining)
birth rates might occur if larger groups exhaust local
resources, are more attractive to natural enemies, or waste
more resources in within-group conflict, so that productivity
per individual eventually declines (Poitrineau et al. 2009; Kra-
mer et al. 2014). Fu et al.’s (2015) models included an extreme
version of birth rate saturation, where the birth rate stayed
constant above group size m. Not surprisingly, this increases
the extinction probability (Fig. 5). Especially at high staying
ratios (q), where groups more often reach the size where
(a) (b)
Figure 4 Performance of our Primitively Eusocial strategy compared with the solitary strategy in relation to the staying ratio (q) and the birth/death ratio
(b/d). Performance is measured in terms of (a) basic reproductive number (R) and (b) the probability of avoiding extinction. Parameter values are
M = m = 3, d0 = 0.1, d = d0i, b0 = 0.12, bΔ = (b  b0)/(m  1). In (b), there is a threshold b/d value (7.2, vertical orange line) at which a worker
increases the queen’s productivity by an amount equal to the productivity of a solitary female (i.e. bΔ = b0 = 0.12, which requires b = 0.36 so that b/
d = 7.2). Above this threshold (green area), workers are more productive than solitary females and the Primitive Eusocial strategy performs best. Below
the threshold (blue + white areas), the solitary strategy performs best. In the white area, the Primitively Eusocial strategy has R < 1 (guaranteeing
extinction) in (a), or has a zero chance of avoiding extinction in (b).
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additional workers have no effect on productivity, the chance
of avoiding extinction may then be smaller than for our Prim-
itively Eusocial strategy (e.g. Fig. 5 with bΔ = 0.13, ‘sat b’
line). However, another widespread feature of social insect
group dynamics, a group size-dependent staying ratio
(GSDQ), has the potential to mitigate this effect. GSDQ
means that groups initially produce mainly or entirely worker
offspring (high q), and switch to producing reproductives
(lower q) only once they reach a certain size. This is typical of
more specialized eusocial taxa such as honeybees, yellowjacket
wasps (Vespinae) and ants, as well some primitively eusocial
lineages such as sweat bees and paper wasps (e.g. Tschinkel
1993; Bourke & Franks 1995; Strohm & Bordon-Hauser 2003;
Peeters & Molet 2010; Leadbeater et al. 2011). Fu et al.’s
(2015) basic asexual model included a component of GSDQ
in that all offspring were assumed to become new reproduc-
tives (q = 0) once a maximum group size (M) was reached.
However, this group size was larger than the group size (m) at
which the birth rate saturated, leading to the production of
workers that added nothing to group productivity (at group
sizes m < i < M). We can instead model a situation where
staying decisions are linked to an offspring’s expected produc-
tivity as a worker: all offspring become workers while produc-
tivity is still increasing linearly below the saturation point
(qi<sat = 1), but a proportion become reproductives once
group size reaches the saturation point (qi≥sat < 1). The extinc-
tion probability can then actually be lower than for the soli-
tary strategy or the simple Primitively Eusocial strategy we
presented earlier (Fig. 5, sat b/GSDQ line). This tends to be
the case when the GSDQ switch is more extreme, that is,
when almost all offspring become reproductives above the sat-
uration point (qi≥sat is low, as well as bΔ > b0; see also fig. S1
of Fu et al. 2015 assuming threshold functions). It is notable
that if the birth rate does not saturate, but remains linear
even at larger group sizes (bΔ > b0 and bΔ remains constant),
as in many primitively eusocial (Fig. 3) and probably some
advanced eusocial taxa (e.g. Kramer et al. 2014), the GSDQ
strategy outperforms our simple Primitively Eusocial strategy
at all values of q (Fig. 5, GSDQ line).
DISCUSSION
The origin of eusociality
In our Primitively Eusocial model, just as in the models of Fu
et al. (2015), a proportion of offspring become workers
instead of being the reproductives that solitary females pro-
duce. However, so long as the positive effect that each worker
has on the queen’s productivity at least matches the produc-
tivity of a dispersing offspring produced by a solitary female,
the basic reproductive numbers and extinction probabilities
for eusociality are at least as favourable as for solitary nesting
(Fig. 4). These conditions are broadly similar to those pre-
dicted to favour helping using Hamilton’s Rule, with r = 1 in
these asexual models. Our analyses suggest that the disadvan-
tage inferred for eusociality by Fu et al. stemmed from
Figure 5 Comparison of basic reproductive numbers, R, and the probability of avoiding extinction (‘emergence probability’ of Fu et al. 2015) for solitary
vs. eusocial strategies when bΔ = 0.165 (upper graphs) and bΔ = 0.13 (lower graphs). Models shown are the Primitively Eusocial model presented earlier
(solid green line) and the same model with the following modifications: a birth rate that saturates at group size m (solid purple line; b = b0 + bΔ (m  1)
for i ≥ m); a GSDQ strategy where q = 1 when group size i < m and q takes the value on the x-axis when m ≤ i < M (dashed green line); both a
saturating birth rate and a GSDQ strategy (dashed purple line). For all models, q = 0 when i = M. Other parameter values: m = 3, M = 5, d0 = 0.1,
d = d0i, b0 = 0.12. Note that when q = 0, all strategies except those involving GSDQ are effectively solitary. Basic reproductive numbers are noticeably
less informative than extinction rates here. For example, R is positively correlated with q under a saturating birth rate, because groups persist for longer
when more offspring choose to become workers, even though the probability of lineage extinction is actually increasing.
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unrealistic assumptions that reduced or delayed the contribu-
tion that workers make to group productivity. In fact, there
are reasons to think that it is dispersing offspring of solitary
genotypes, rather than worker offspring of eusocial genotypes,
that will experience the greater delay in realising their produc-
tivity in nature. Unlike workers, dispersing offspring must
find a nest site and initiate a nest before they can begin repro-
ducing. Dispersing offspring must start rearing the youngest
possible brood (eggs) in a new nest, whereas workers can
often begin rearing older offspring that are already present in
their natal nests (reproductive head-start: Queller 1989, see
also Avila & Fromhage 2015). Furthermore, unlike a solitary
female, the investment that a worker makes in rearing off-
spring may not be completely wasted if she dies young: other
group members may be able to bring the part-reared offspring
that she contributed to through to adulthood (Gadagkar
1990; Field et al. 2000). In contrast, the death of a solitary
female usually leads to the total failure of any part-reared
brood (Field et al. 2000; Shreeves et al. 2003).
Are there empirical exceptions to our evaluation of the
assumptions made by Fu et al.? Although group productivity
increases gradually with group size in primitively eusocial
Hymenoptera, the increase may not always be linear. For
example, Brand & Chapuisat (2014) found that the first 4
workers each added a similar amount to the queen’s produc-
tivity in the sweat bee Halictus scabiosae (Rossi), while addi-
tional workers beyond 4 had a smaller but still positive effect
(Fig. 3, see also Schwarz et al. 1998 and discussion of more
specialized eusocial taxa below). Second, queen replacement
might not always be entirely cost free, as assumed in our
Primitively Eusocial model. While not causing complete group
failure as Fu et al. assumed, queen death may sometimes lead
to a temporary slow-down in offspring production while
workers compete to become the new queen. In some primi-
tively eusocial taxa, a gerontocratic inheritance system where
the new queen is always the oldest surviving female may lar-
gely avoid conflict during queen replacement (Bridge & Field
2007; see also Bang & Gadagkar 2012). However, Strassmann
et al. (2004) found that some forms of aggression between
nest-mates increased and nest growth temporarily decreased
following experimental removal of the queen from groups of
paper wasps (see also Tsuji & Tsuji 2005). Natural queen
deaths might not always have this effect if cues signifying
queen ageing (Panek et al. 2001) enable replacement queens to
prepare physiologically for their new roles in advance. Note
that another possible cost of queen death, reduced reproduc-
tive potential (e.g. fertility) of replacement- vs. original
queens, seems unlikely close to the origin of eusociality. Over-
all, empirical evidence indicates that routine queen replace-
ment, and rates of offspring production that increase
gradually with group size, are representative of primitively
eusocial Hymenoptera.
Our analysis indicates that the risk-return tradeoff identified
by Fu et al. does not apply to the origin of eusociality. What,
then, is the explanation for the apparent rarity with which
eusociality has evolved (Fu et al. 2015)? The answer may be
that no explanation is needed. What counts as rarity is debat-
able (Bourke 2011b; Liao et al. 2015), and eusociality cannot
evolve in just any taxon. For example, ancestral provisioning
of a nest is logically necessary before workers can boost the
reproduction of a queen by provisioning her offspring, helping
to explain the disproportionate number of origins of eusocial-
ity in the Hymenoptera. Nevertheless, eusociality has evolved
more than 20 times in insects and an even greater number of
times in vertebrates (Bourke 2011a; note that cooperative
breeding is essentially equivalent to eusociality). A concrete
comparison has been made with powered flight, which like
eusociality is an ecologically very successful trait. Powered
flight has evolved only four times, suggesting that conditions
for the evolution of eusociality are at least 10 times less strin-
gent (Bourke 2011b).
The origin of more specialised castes
Eusocial taxa living in larger groups with morphologically
specialized castes also do not appear to face a risk-return
tradeoff. There is again little evidence of a threshold group
size below which workers are unproductive, and queen death
does not generally lead to catastrophic group failure, although
outcomes following queen death need further study (see
Fig. S11). However, the birth rate may saturate (decline) in
larger groups, reducing the probability that a eusocial geno-
type avoids extinction. Our results show that the phylogeneti-
cally widespread GSDQ strategy, where colony growth
(worker production) precedes reproduction, has the potential
to mitigate the effect of birth rate saturation if the switch to
reproduction occurs at a group size matching the saturation
point (Fig. 5). Empirical work is needed to determine how
close the match actually is.
Our results also provide a new explanation for the evolution
of GSDQ strategies generally. At the group level, GSDQ has
previously been thought to optimize reproductive output when
the growing season is finite: in seasonal environments where
early offspring become workers while those produced later (in
larger groups) enter hibernation and become queens the fol-
lowing year (Macevicz & Oster 1976; Mitesser et al. 2007). In
such environments, it is also clear how GSDQ could be adap-
tive at the individual level – if offspring become workers ear-
lier in the season (in smaller groups), they have more time left
in which to be productive (Lucas & Field 2013). It is therefore
notable that GSDQ improves the performance of our Primi-
tively Eusocial strategy even in the completely aseasonal envi-
ronment of our model. So long as workers in small groups
are more productive than lone females (bΔ > b0), earlier
worker production (GSDQ’s initially high staying ratio)
makes it more likely that offspring take advantage of this
greater productivity by becoming workers before the group
fails. This helps to explain why some taxa that are restricted
to less seasonal environments still exhibit GSDQ (e.g. tropical
stingless bees, Meliponinae).
CONCLUSION
Our analysis shows that assumptions about life history and
ecology, not just genetic relatedness, matter critically when
considering both the origin and elaboration of eusociality (see
also Korb & Heinze 2008; Fromhage & Kokko 2011; Nonacs
2011, 2019; Avila & Fromhage 2015). The risk-return tradeoff
© 2019 The Authors. Ecology Letters published by CNRS and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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proposed at the origin of eusociality by Fu et al. (2015) is not
robust to realistic assumptions. However, their general mod-
elling framework is still potentially useful. For example,
because it explicitly models lineage extinction, their approach
could be used to compare eusociality with solitary nesting in
terms of risk-spreading. As a simple illustration, if we con-
sider our Primitively Eusocial model with queen replacement,
equal mortality rates for all individuals, and with bΔ = b0 at
all group sizes, we might expect eusociality and solitary nest-
ing to perform equally well. Effectively, a eusocial group with
i individuals is then no more than the sum of i solitary indi-
viduals. Indeed, we find that in this case the two genotypes
have equal extinction probabilities. However, if we then add a
low rate of group size-independent whole nest failure, which
might represent predators occasionally overwhelming the
group, we find that the extinction probability for eusociality
slightly exceeds that for solitary nesting. This is because the
solitary strategy is effectively spreading risk in the sense of
‘not putting all your eggs in one basket’ (see section 7 of Sup-
porting Information for more details). To see this, imagine a
simple scenario where a nest-initiating foundress always pro-
duces two offspring and then dies. If she has a eusocial geno-
type, the two offspring always stay in their natal nest and
reproduce at rate 2b, whereas if she has the solitary genotype,
each offspring initiates a separate nest and reproduces at rate
b. Further imagine that before the offspring begin to repro-
duce, whole nest failure destroys a random half of the nests in
the population. Half of the eusocial nests are destroyed and
so have zero productivity, while the other half survive and
have productivity 2b, giving a mean productivity of b for a
eusocial foundress. For the solitary strategy, there is a 25%
chance that both daughter nests fail (giving zero productivity),
a 50% chance that one fails (giving b), and a 25% chance that
neither fails (giving 2b). On average, productivity is again b
for the solitary foundress, but the chance of zero productivity
(extinction) is smaller under solitary nesting. Solitary foun-
dresses effectively spread risk across more nests, lessening the
risk of catastrophe before any offspring have been produced.
Modelling extinction probabilities has the potential to be a
generally useful tool to investigate risk-spreading under differ-
ent social life-histories.
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